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Capitalism and Financial Development: The
Case of Mortgage Markets in France, 1807–1899
Philip T. Hoffman, Gilles Postel-Vinay
and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal
Historical research can contribute to greater understanding of economic growth, but only
if it proceeds without theoretical blinders and assumptions imposed by past definitions
of capitalism. We will make this case, by taking one particular historical example—
mortgage markets in nineteenth-century France—and analyzing the financial develop-
ment that accompanied the rise of capitalism there. The French example demonstrates
that there is an immense amount that historians and social scientists still do not know
about economic growth or capitalism. One common assumption is that little financing
takes place before big banks and other modern financial institutions arrive on the scene.
No one, however, has ever tested this implicit assumption by estimating how much lending
or other financial dealing occurred before the arrival of the banks and modern financial
institutions in developed economies. Although scholars have studied financial dealings
back into the Middle Ages or before, no one knows whether the sums involved were big
or small. We do so and discover that the sums involved were enormous. That so much
borrowing went on outside modern financial institutions raises serious doubts about the
argument that connects financial development and economic growth. Our research also
makes it clear that context was critical when entrepreneurs raised money in the early
stages of economic growth or when young businesses or firms in new industries sought
funds.
Our brutal financial crisis has revived historians’ interest in capitalism. The sub-
ject, after having faded from historical research years ago, has suddenly returned
with renewed vigor. Historians are now writing about capitalism and studying it in
archives and libraries, even if they do not agree on what it is.1 For some, it might be
Marx’s capitalism, with masses of workers toiling in great factories and enslaved by
machines, as capital replaces labor. For others, it might be Schumpeter’s capitalism,
with its constant renewal and innovation, through the process of creative destruction,
or Polanyi’s wrenching process of cultural change as markets upturn society. For most
historians, though, there is no precise definition—just exciting research—although
most would agree that whatever capitalism is, financial markets must loom large in
its workings.
Meanwhile, many other social scientists (though not all of them) have moved on,
and instead of talking about capitalism, they focus on economic growth. One might
worry that such a shift is risky, because economic growth has too many positive
1. See, e.g., Jennifer Schuessler, “In History Departments, It’s Up with Capitalism,” New York Times
(April 6, 2013), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/07/education/in-history-departments-its-up-
with-capitalism.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (accessed June 25, 2013), and the 287 comments the article
had attracted as of that date.
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connotations. It is true that the narrative of progress implicit in growth can make
short shrift of the conflicts imbedded in any definition of capitalism, whether they pit
workers against factory owners, innovators against incumbents, or financiers against
the middle class. Nonetheless, economic growth does include everything bound up
in the older definitions of capitalism. When economies grow, society is turned upside
down, as people abandon the countryside and agricultural employment to live in
cities and work in factories. Nineteenth-century economic growth did involve capital
replacing labor, and modern economic growth does depend either on innovation in
Schumpeter’s sense or on substituting human capital (essentially knowledge, training,
and productive personal traits) for unskilled labor. Markets do typically expand as
economies grow, and big markets do in fact increase the incentives for innovation
and growth. One might also worry that economic growth is too narrow a concept and
focuses too much on macroeconomic aggregates like per capita income or debt to gross
domestic product (GDP). Yet that criticism fails to recognize that economic growth
encompasses what historians have typically associated with capitalism, and more
too, including what is implicit in much of the recent historical research: the greater
efficiency of businesses under capitalism, the rising precariousness and inequality,
the greater scale of markets and firms, and the enormous expansion of the financial
sector, with its large banks, big stock markets, and gigantic financial dealings.
In our view, the revival of interest in capitalism offers an opportunity for fruit-
ful historical research that would be of considerable interest in the social sciences.
Most social scientists recognize that prosperity and economic growth are long-term
processes and that cross-country comparisons are perilous and problematic. They
are perilous because leveling the playing field in comparing the performance of two
geographic units is extremely difficult, and they are problematic because the lessons
gained from the success in one location may have little or no value in helping another
location improve its economic outcome. Here historical research can contribute to a
better understanding of economic performance, but only if it proceeds without the
theoretical blinders imposed by definitions of capitalism from prior centuries.
Those older definitions are dangerously misleading because they drive historians
to focus on a narrow range of phenomena and an equally narrow range of connections
among workers, firms, and finance that would most miss the true process of economic
change, which cannot be reduced to the rise of a Krupp, Standard Oil, or Crédit
Mobilier in each country. In reality, the process involves a very broad variety of
actors and organizations whose interaction are context dependent. It is this last fact
that gives relevance—one might say primacy—to historical research.
We will make this case, by taking one particular historical example—credit markets
in nineteenth-century France—and analyzing the financial development that accom-
panied the rise of capitalism there. The French example demonstrates that there is
an immense amount that historians and social scientists still do not know about eco-
nomic growth or capitalism. Our ignorance is greatest in areas where historians could
in fact cast more light than anyone else: on the detailed social, cultural, and political
context of economic growth—how, for instance, new firms or entrepreneurs in new
industries got their initial financing, or how lenders learned whether borrowers were
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credit worthy. Those topics have been neglected by social scientists, and studying
them would not mean that historians have to limit themselves to economic history.
Rather, they could do social, cultural, political, or business history, or a mix of each
of these genres. There are, in short, great opportunities for novel historical research
on capitalism and economic growth in general, not just on France or on financial
development—a topic that we shall return to in the conclusion.
Focusing on financial development is straightforward because if there is one thing
that virtually everyone associates with capitalism, it is the large banks, big stock
markets, and gigantic financial dealings. Economists who study economic growth
agree on giving pride of place to finance. Recent research in fact shows that financial
development (in other words, the expansion of financial markets and the spread of
modern financial institutions such as banks) does accompany economic growth, and
statistical evidence implies that the relationship is causal: if financial development
is retarded, then economic growth suffers and incomes remain low.2 Research in
economic history tells the same story.3
Yet despite all this research, much about the relationship between economic growth
and financial development remains murky or completely unknown. Financial devel-
opment should be essential for economic growth, for obvious reasons. Entrepreneurs
have to raise equity funding and borrow from banks and investors to put innovations
into production. Businessmen have to take out loans to start businesses, build facto-
ries, pay for their inventory, and meet their payroll before sales revenues start pouring
in. And someone has to finance the housing and infrastructure that all the new urban
workers will dwell in. Although private developers may build the apartments and even
the roads, they too have to raise money, typically from modern financial institutions,
such as banks or insurance companies. Without the banks and other modern financial
institutions, none of this (so it seems) would happen. Economic growth would grind
to a halt, because no one could raise much money.
The critical but implicit assumption here is that little financing takes place before
the banks and other modern financial institutions arrive on the scene. Only when they
step on the stage are entrepreneurs, businessmen, and real estate developers able to
work their magic, for without the banks and modern institutions they cannot raise any
money to get started. No one, however, has ever tested this implicit assumption. No
one has even estimated how much lending or other financial dealing occurred before
the arrival of the banks and modern financial institutions in developed economies.
Although scholars have studied financial dealings back into the Middle Ages or before,
no one knows whether the sums involved were big or small.
Testing that assumption would, of course, mean setting aside older definitions of
capitalism, because they would dismiss such questions as unimportant. It would also
mean voyaging into uncharted territories of scholarship. But the rewards for such a
journey would be great, and the research that needs to be done (so our conclusions
2. Burgess and Pande 2005; Demetriades and Luintel 1996; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 2004; King and
Levine 1993; Levine 1997; Rajan and Zingales 2004.
3. Davis and Gallman 1978; Gerschenkron 1962; Neal 1994; Postan 1935; Rousseau 1999; Rousseau
and Sylla 2003, 2005, 2006; Sylla 1999; Temin and Voth 2006, 2013.
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FIGURE 1. (Colour online) Markets in our sample with their stock of outstanding debt
in 1807. The stock of outstanding debt is estimated by multiplying the volume of new
loans in each market in 1807 times average durations for each type of loan.
suggest) is just what historians can do best, because it demands careful attention to the
social, political, cultural, and economic context. If historians take up this challenge
and pursue these questions, their work will have the enormous virtue of correcting
what many other social scientists think they know about the ties between financial
development and economic growth, and it will map out, in vivid detail, what actually
happened with financial markets as capitalism grew. We take the first steps of this
journey here by looking at mortgage markets in France.
Financial Intermediaries and Mortgage Lending in Nineteenth-Century
France
To see how traditional markets evolved in France as a whole and to investigate how
they operated locally, we gathered data on more than 200,000 mortgage loans drawn
from a sample of 105 credit markets scattered through France (see figure 1 for a
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map). The 105 markets were chosen to yield a stratified sample of towns and cities
that would reflect the French economy as a whole. The markets include Paris; other
big cities such as Lyon; medium-sized urban centers with 10,000 to 70,000 habitants,
such as Grenoble; and smaller towns with populations as low as 500 people. Mortgage
loans were subject to a tax, and our data come from archives of the tax offices, which
covered lending in the municipality where the office was located and in surrounding
towns and villages. The information we collected includes the number and size of
new loans and loan durations; it allowed us to estimate the volume of new loans
and stock of outstanding debt in each market for six years: 1740, 1780 1807, 1840,
1865, and 1899. The dates of these estimates were chosen to be roughly a generation
apart. The first date, 1740, was set by the availability of the earliest usable tax records
(before the French Revolution, the Contrôle des actes). The last date was set by the
requirement that the tax records and associated notarial documents be sealed for a
century.4 Here we will focus heavily on the nineteenth century, the period when France
industrialized, and look at a major segment of the financial system: mortgages—or
more precisely, lending secured by real assets, using a systematic sample of mortgage
loans (described in the following text) that yields the first estimates of how much
lending was done before banks and modern financial institutions proliferated.
The market for mortgages in France turns out to have been huge, even before
the country was fully industrialized. In 1840, for instance, outstanding mortgage
debt in France amounted to 28 percent of GDP, or about the same level relative to
the size of the economy as in the United States in the 1950s.5 The big surprise is
that very little of this debt—only 0.3 percent—was funded by the modern financial
intermediaries—banks—that were just beginning to spread across France. Nor were
the mortgages made by other modern financial intermediaries, for the country’s first
successful mortgage bank (the Crédit Foncier) would not be founded until 1852, and
other modern intermediaries were not doing mortgage loans either. And 1840 is not
at all exceptional. Even in 1899, when banks had multiplied throughout France and
industrialization had long been underway, large numbers of mortgages still originated
outside the modern financial system. Indeed, in that year, outstanding mortgages that
passed through the Crédit Foncier or other banks totaled only 6 percent of GDP. The
rest—18 percent of GDP—had been arranged in some other way, by the borrowers or
lenders (which turns out not to be the case) or by some unknown traditional financial
intermediaries.6
Traditional intermediaries were in fact putting the loans together in nineteenth-
century France, and we have uncovered who they were. They turn out to have been the
4. The purview of the 105 tax offices used in our sample did change somewhat over time. To allow for
proper comparison across years, we limited each market to loans drawn up by notaries who resided in
the canton where the tax office was located. A canton is the French administrative division just above the
municipality and usually consists of a town or city and several nearby villages.
5. The stock of US mortgage debt was 11 percent of GDP in 1944 and averaged 30 percent in the 1950s,
according to Federal Reserve Bank data at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/Current/data.htm
(accessed August 29, 2013).
6. Like the estimate of total mortgage debt for France in 1840, the estimate for 1899 also comes from
our sample, which we describe in the following text.
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country’s notaries, semiprivate court officers who preserved records and also provided
legal and financial advice. They were raising huge amounts of savings for mortgage
lending, and they were efficient at doing it, for as we show in the following text, they
were not driven out of business when the chief modern financial intermediaries in
France—banks—spread throughout the country. That raises serious questions about
the causal link between modern financial development and economic growth, because
the statistical evidence supporting this link ignores traditional lending such as the
mortgages brokered by notaries. Taking that traditional lending into account will force
us to rethink the connection between modern financial development and economic
growth—in other words, between modern financial development and capitalism, for
it was likely weaker than most of us thought, at least in the case of France. As we
shall see, the loans arranged by the traditional intermediaries played a much bigger
role in economic growth than anyone expected. Growth cannot simply be attributed
to the appearance of banks and other modern financial intermediaries, for traditional
intermediaries did not suddenly vanish but were still doing much of the financing
needed for growth. At the very least, loans they brokered funded the construction
of housing and infrastructure that accompany economic growth. Without their loans,
construction would have screeched to a halt and growth would have come to a near
stop too. And their role went beyond housing and infrastructure, for evidence from
four case studies we will analyze suggests that they may have also provided initial
funding for new firms in capital-intensive industries.
Again, our evidence does only come from one country, but the French example
was not unusual. In 1900, mortgage markets were large in Britain, Germany, and
the United States too, and although the three economies all had highly developed
financial systems, between 32 and 65 percent of mortgage lending still being done by
various sorts of traditional financial intermediaries, outside the circle of banks and the
modern financial sector.7 We still do not know who these traditional intermediaries
were in Britain, Germany, and the United States. And we do not know either how
these intermediaries operated, how much business they did, or how they determined
what investments to fund.8
So how did the French mortgage market and its intermediaries—the notaries—
work? In nineteenth-century France, mortgage loan contracts were drawn up by the
notaries, who drafted other legal documents as well, from leases and land sales to
wills, probate inventories, estate divisions, and marriage contracts. The notaries had to
preserve authentic copies of everything they drew up, and they also arranged property
sales. In the course of their business, they learned who had money to lend, who was
a good credit risk, and how much land pledged as collateral was worth. They also
7. The estimates for Britain are derived from Sheppard 1971 and Offer 1981; for details, see Hoffman
et al. 2010. Those for the United States come from Goldsmith 1969. For Germany, they are based on
information in Hoffmann 1965; Koch 1911; and Preussische Statistik 1905–1906: 91; details about the
German estimates are available from the authors. For the importance of mortgages in the United States
later on, during the Great Depression, see Wigmore 2010.
8. We do know that attorneys and scriveners arranged mortgages in Britain; see Anderson 1969; Habakkuk
1994; Miles 1981; and Neal 1994.
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knew whether collateral had already been mortgaged, either through the business of
arranging loans or the government’s lien registry, whose intricacies they knew well.
They were thus ideally placed to solve the informational problems that confronted
borrowers and lenders in the mortgage market: namely, will the borrower repay the
loan, and if not, will the borrower’s collateral compensate the lender?
Because they knew who the potential lenders were—people with money to lend—
and who the creditworthy borrowers were—those with valuable collateral and a record
of repayment—it is not a surprise that they went beyond simply drafting mortgage
loan contracts and actually brokered the loans. They could do a much better job of
it than the borrowers and lenders, who would have to rely on personal ties of family,
neighborhood, and profession to find lenders or trustworthy borrowers and so would
have much less information than the notaries. When originating loans, the notaries
did not take money on deposit and then use it to fund mortgages; rather, they simply
matched up borrowers and lenders, in much the same way that a real estate agent
today might match up buyers and sellers. In Britain attorneys had almost the same
informational advantage, and they played a similar role in putting mortgage lenders
and borrowers together.9
Banks—particularly commercial banks—were the chief major modern financial
intermediary in nineteenth-century France. Although securities markets for stocks
and bonds were important, banks have long been considered to be the financial in-
termediaries who were critical for economic growth. Nineteenth-century France had
three types of banks: local commercial banks (an ever-increasingly dense network
that spread across the urban hierarchy); what we will call investment banks (mostly
in Paris and often known as the Haute Banque), which engaged in commercial banking
but also underwrote the issue of new securities, though they did not usually hold on
to the securities in their own account; and by the 1860 a few banks with branches and
corporate charters, which by the eve of World War I were starting to drive the local
commercial banks out of markets. These so-called universal banks, which could make
short-term commercial loans to businesses and fund long-term ventures such as the
building of a factory, have received a great deal of attention, but during the nineteenth
century in France, the closest bank in most places was a local commercial bank.
In general, the commercial banks secured short-term funds from depositors and then
used it and their owners’ equity to fund short-term commercial loans. Occasionally,
the commercial banks and the Haute Banque would make the sort of longer-term
investments that made nineteenth-century industrialization possible. But relying on
either sort of bank for longer-term funding was risky. If a bank rolled over short-
term loans to fund the construction of a factory (as happened in the United States),
then the borrower faced the risk that the loans would be cancelled in the middle of
9. For the role that notaries played, see Hoffman et al. 2000 on the case of Paris, where notaries began
matching large numbers of borrowers and lenders in the eighteenth century, after the Law affair; for the rest
of France, see our forthcoming book on mortgage markets in France. For the British case, see Anderson
1969; Miles 1981; and Neal 1994.
20 Social Science History
construction, before the factory had begun producing goods.10 And if the bank made
a long-term commitment (say by making a long-term loan), then it bore enormous
risks, particularly if it was hit by a bank run or the sort of liquidity crises that were
common in the nineteenth century. The bank would then have likely failed, just as
Lehman Brothers did at the outset of our own recent mortgage debacle.
Banks did still have certain advantages. By holding a portfolio of loans, they could
reduce the risks they faced and also give bank owners a diversified portfolio of in-
vestments. They could offer depositors accounts that could pay interest and yet be
easily turned into cash by withdrawing funds, unlike an illiquid long-term loan bro-
kered by a notary. As the century wore on, the universal banks in France reduced the
risk of bank runs by opening branches and diversifying the source of their deposits
geographically. In addition, the investment banks and some commercial banks were
deeply involved in providing short-term financing for French industry and trade in the
nineteenth century, and one could easily imagine that they would develop expertise
in industrial or commercial lending that no notary could ever acquire.11 One might
therefore expect that banks in general would be the efficient low-cost lenders, and
because nothing stopped banks either from entering markets (there were no capital
requirements or regulations that limited entry) or from making mortgage loans, one
might expect them to compete with the traditional intermediaries—the notaries—and
eventually drive them out of the mortgage market.12
If banks were so much more efficient, then it would be tempting to single out
certain key changes in their operations or in the legislation governing business as
critical moments in the rise of financial capitalism in France: the founding of the
bank of France in 1797; the Code de Commerce in 1806; the first universal bank,
the Crédit Mobilier in 1852; or the general incorporation law in 1867, which paved
the way for corporate banks. Those changes are certainly important, but focusing on
them distorts the historical record, both for French banks and for the notaries, as the
workings of the mortgage market will show. While social scientists recognize the
importance of informal or traditional credit markets in a variety of settings (e.g., in
development economics), few of them are willing to go into the archives to figure
out who these intermediaries were and how they arranged credit. The responsibility
of recovering the history of financial transactions throughout the world therefore lies
10. For examples of how short-term loans were rolled over to fund long-term investments in the United
States, see Davis 1972: 349; Lamoreaux 1994.
11. For banks’ financing of industry and trade in nineteenth-century France, see Cameron 1961; Gille
1959; Lescure Plessis 1999, which also covers the growth of branch banking after 1870; and Lévy-Leboyer
1964.
12. Anyone could open a bank or act as a banker, although only the Banque de France could issue bank
notes. Banks did face one constraint if they entered the mortgage business: they could not sell mortgages
to the Banque de France, which only accepted high-grade commercial paper for rediscount. But the same
constraint would apply to their financing long-term investment in industry. Most banks were partnerships or
sole proprietorships until the 1850s, when corporate banks appeared; they had the ability to open branches.
It was once thought that nineteenth-century France lacked banks (Cameron 1967: 110–11, 127) and that
the small number of banks retarded French industrialization. That claim has been overturned by Lescure
and Plessis 1999; Lévy-Leboyer 1964; Lévy-Leboyer and Bourguignon 1985; O’Brien and Kayder 1978;
and Roehl 1976.
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TABLE 1. Mortgage lending in the sample and France, 1807–99
Year 1807 1840 1865 1899
Number of mortgage loans in sample
All 23,739 40,046 30,557 19,325
Notarial 23,738 39,887 29,762 18,268
Notarial/All 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.95
Volume of new loans in sample (million francs)
All 52 115 148 148
Notarial 52 110 107 114
Notarial/All 1.00 0.96 0.72 0.77
Estimated volume of new mortgage loans for France as whole (million francs)
All 470 840 1,161 1,159
Notarial 470 817 952 957
Notarial/All 1.00 0.97 0.82 0.83
Estimated stock of outstanding mortgage debt for France as a whole (billion francs)
All 1.79 3.69 4.75 7.93
Notarial 1.79 3.68 4.07 5.90
GDP 11.7 13.4 20.9 32.6
All/GDP 0.15 0.28 0.23 0.24
Notarial/GDP 0.15 0.27 0.19 0.18
Source: See text. The GDP figures come from Toutain 1987; for 1807, GDP is assumed to grow at
0.4 percent per year between 1807 and Toutain’s earliest GDP estimate (1815).
Note: Notarial lending includes all mortgages in which the lender was not a bank. GDP per capita
is calculated using the census closest to the dates of our cross-sections (1806, 1841, 1866, 1896).
with historians. The importance of this responsibility cannot be understated. To take
but one example, with a better historical understanding could Ben Bernanke have ever
uttered the words “We’ve never had a decline in housing prices on a nationwide basis
(July 29, 2005)”? To be sure, there had been no such decline since World War II, but
that is a short history that leaves out the Great Depression and earlier crises. History,
in short, may not prevent financial crises, but it remains our sole source of experience
by which we judge the present.
Banks, Notaries, and Mortgages
Although the mortgages could be arranged by anyone, most were brokered by
notaries. The lenders in the loans they arranged were individuals (sometimes several
of them), whom the notary had matched up with the borrower. The vast majority of
the mortgages—95 percent or more in the years of our sample—fell into this cate-
gory, which we will call notarial debt and consider to be traditional lending (table 1).
The remaining mortgage loans were made by banks. These bank mortgages included
mortgage-backed credit lines, and the loans made by the Crédit Foncier, which funded
its lending by selling mortgage-backed securities. (It alone could issue such debt, and
as with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac today, its debt carried a de facto government
guarantee.) But even with the bank mortgages, the notaries were still involved, for
they continued to draw up the loan contracts and check the lien registers, and they
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could have even provided some of the advice that led borrowers to seek a loan from a
bank or led the bank to grant the loan. Our figures for traditional lending may therefore
be underestimates, for some of the bank debt may actually have been arranged (at
least in part) by notaries too.
But even if we ignore that possibility, it is abundantly clear that traditional mortgage
lending was large. If we use population data to extrapolate from our sample to France
as a whole, then there were likely to have been more than 1 million notarial mortgages
outstanding at any time in the nineteenth century. The value of the outstanding notarial
debt ranged between a low of 15 percent of GDP right after the Revolution (in 1807)
to a high of 27 percent (in 1840), which, as we have seen, was on a par with the level
of outstanding mortgage debt in the United States in the 1950s. And notaries, not
banks, did the bulk of mortgage lending too: never less than 82 percent of the funds
raised in the years of our sample (table 1).
Clearly, notarial lending was large in nineteenth-century France, much bigger
than traditional lending is usually assumed to be. But perhaps the modern finan-
cial intermediaries—the banks—were more efficient and were actually driving the
notaries out of the mortgage business, by making loans at lower cost. The number of
banks was in fact growing in our sample (there were less than four banks per market
in our sample in 1807 but more than 12 per market in 1899) as in the rest of France.
The mortgage lending the banks did was growing as well (table 1). Were these banks
pushing notaries out of the mortgage lending?
The evidence from our sample says no. If the banks had been driving the notaries
out of the mortgage business, then notarial lending should have dropped when banks
opened in our markets, and data from our sample shows that was not the case. Nor were
banks targeting markets where notaries would be vulnerable to competition: markets
with only a few notaries where they had been arranging a large number of loans.13
Instead of competing for the mortgage business, the banks (apart from the Crédit
Foncier) stuck to the usual business of making short-term commercial loans, which
financed inventories or trade. Only rarely did they get involved in mortgages, and the
notaries therefore operated in a completely different credit market. The reason why is
clear. Banks simply lacked the information needed to succeed in the mortgage markets.
They did not know the value of the real property that served as collateral, and they
lacked the notaries’ long experience with mortgage lenders and borrowers. Although
they could learn about collateral and past lending by investigating the government’s
lien registry, the notaries had an enormous head start. A banker would be better off
hiring a notary (as the Crédit Foncier did) or simply staying out of the mortgage market
and specializing instead in short-term commercial lending, where the notaries had no
experience. With the exception of the Crédit Foncier, which had government backing,
the notaries and the banks therefore operated in different financial markets. The two
sets of intermediaries—one traditional, the other modern—in fact complemented one
another, with more banks seeming to spur on notarial lending and likely vice versa
too.
13. Hoffman et al. 2013.
Capitalism and Financial Development 23
The implication is that financial development had less effect than anyone thought,
at least in the case of nineteenth-century France. If financial development is defined as
the arrival of banks and other modern financial institutions, then its impact was muf-
fled because traditional financial intermediaries—in the French case notaries—were
already doing an immense amount of lending. The key modern financial intermediary
in nineteenth-century France—banks—did not drive notaries out of the mortgage
market or even do much mortgage lending, even though there were no legal or regu-
latory obstacles that kept them from competing with notaries. Instead, the bankers by
and large stuck to short-term commercial loans and did some longer-term industrial
investment.
Did Notarial Lending Contribute to Economic Growth?
Notaries were arranging large numbers of mortgage loans in nineteenth-century
France and mobilizing large sums of financial capital for the mortgage market. And
they were not at all outmoded or inefficient; otherwise they would have been driven
out of business by banks. But did all the mortgage loans they arranged contribute to
economic growth?
Answering that question is tricky. To begin, French entrepreneurs seeking capital
were not faced with a stark choice—mortgages, banks, or nothing—for there were
other sources of financing as well. Even small firms could also raise capital by privately
selling equity to investors—so-called private placements. That was easier in France
than in many other places, because the Code de Commerce allowed partnerships to
take on a wide variety of forms that allocated income, authority, and risk on a partner
by partner basis. Evidence for Paris suggests that this was an important avenue for
securing funds.14 Larger firms had even more choice, even before general incorpo-
ration in 1867, because the Code de Commerce allowed individuals to form limited
partnerships with tradable shares. These large firms could issue publically traded
equity or bonds. Initial or secondary offerings were handled by the investment banks,
and there were secondary markets in Paris and a half dozen other cities each with an
official list and an over-the-counter (coulisse) market. So if notaries had ceased to
arrange mortgages, industrial finance would not have dried up.
Ideally, we could determine whether notaries contributed to economic growth by
analyzing what their mortgage loans funded, but the tax records that provided our
evidence do not usually reveal the purpose of the loans. Although the original notarial
contracts sometimes state what the mortgages were to be used for, most of them are
silent about the purpose too, and even if they were not, it would take gigantic budget
or decades of research to read even a sample of the contracts for our 105 markets.
But there is indirect evidence that the notarial lending played an important role in
the mobilization of capital and hence in economic growth. To begin with, structures—
houses, apartments, and buildings for government and industry—formed the bulk of
14. Lamoreaux and Rosenthal 2005.
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capital in France: between 59 and 66 percent of the capital stock (or more precisely
the stock of tangible and reproducible nonhuman assets) between 1815 and 1900.15
The same was true of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Britain and the United
States between 1850 and 1958. In both cases, the percentage of capital constituted by
structures is nearly the same as in France.16 But structures were typically financed
through a mortgage on the building and the underlying land. The structure might
be a family’s house, an apartment or factory building, or a plant to process crops,
such as a distillery.17 Or it might be new real estate development, as in 1899, when
the mason Urbain Dupuis and the retired notary Louis Lux borrowed 211,000 francs
in the mortgage market to fund a development in Lyon.18 Without the mortgages,
nearly all of which were arranged by notaries, the supply of funds to finance either
construction or purchases of existing structures would be severely restricted, because
investors would hesitate to take on the risk of making unsecured long-term loans. To
compensate them, interest rates would have risen, and so therefore would the cost
of buying or renting a structure, whether it was a house, an apartment, or a factory.
Economic growth would inevitably suffer as well, and suffer considerably because
structures constituted such a large portion of the capital stock.
At the very least then, the notaries clearly helped make possible the housing and
construction that accompany economic growth. Without them, workers would not
have found housing, peasants would not have migrated to cities, and, with a stunted
urban population, economic growth would have slowed. But did the notaries contribute
to economic growth—and hence to capitalism—in any other way? In particular, did
any of their loans fund industrialization directly?
That question is harder to answer, because we do not know the purpose of most
of the mortgages. But the borrowers’ occupations shed some light on what the loans
were being used for. Inferring the purpose of a loan from borrowers’ occupations
is, of course, hardly a perfect indicator, for several reasons. To begin with, occupa-
tional labels are sometimes vague, particularly for catchall terms such as “person
of independent means” (rentier), or “property owner” (propriétaire), which could be
stretched to cover anyone from a farmer with some land to a small business owner with
a bit of real estate. And even though many nineteenth-century occupational names
are quite precise, a loan could still involve, say, an industrial entrepreneur borrowing
to purchase real estate, or (as we will see) a lawyer taking out a mortgage to finance
the creation of a large electrical utility. The borrower’s occupation would mislead us
in both cases.19 Still, there should be at least a rough correlation between borrowers’
15. Lévy-Leboyer 1977: 396. See also Grantham 1993.
16. Field 1985.
17. For financing distilleries using mortgages, see Postel-Vinay 1998: 272–73.
18. Archives départementales du Rhône, 49Q 304 (February 27, 1899), 49Q 305 (May 5, 1899), 49Q305bis
(June 27, 1899).
19. One could easily imagine other instances where occupational labels would be misleading. A textile
worker who takes out a loan would be classified as an industrial borrower by his occupation, and he may
in fact intend to set up a business making cloth. But it is also conceivable that he inherited some property
and is using that property as collateral to repay debts.
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occupations and the purpose of the loans, because both borrowers and lenders had an
interest in funding businesses related to the borrowers’ skills and human capital.
Let us then analyze borrowers’ occupations in 4 of the 105 markets where we
have gathered data on mortgage lending (figures 2 through 5). We can classify the
occupations by the sector of the economy where the borrower was employed and
see how many work in industry. Such borrowers would include industrial workers,
craftsmen, managers, manufacturers, and owners of industrial firms. Our sectors of
the economy would also include multiowner firms as borrowers, because it is difficult
what sector of the economy they are in, and a separate category for property owners
and rentiers.
One of the four markets where we have carried out this analysis is Paris, the biggest
city in France, with a population of 935,000 in 1841. Besides being the capital, it was
an international hub for industry, commerce, and finance. The other three markets—
Amiens, Lyon, and Troyes—were all industrial centers. In 1841 Amiens, with 47,000
inhabitants, was a locus of textile manufacturing in northern France. Troyes, some
160 kilometers to the east of Paris, was slightly smaller (its population was 25,000
in 1841) and had attracted makers of hosiery and cotton textiles. Finally, Lyon, with
156,000 inhabitants in 1841, was a major silk manufacturer in the southeast. It and
its hinterland also had a great deal of metal working, and by the beginning of the
twentieth century, Lyon had developed a chemical industry and was manufacturing
industrial equipment and early motor vehicles.20
In Amiens, borrowers in industry (chiefly in textile manufacturing) constituted 28
percent of those who took out loans in 1840, and the money they borrowed amounted to
25 percent of the new mortgages that were arranged that year (figure 2). The fraction
of industrial borrowers had risen sharply since 1807, as manufacturing in Amiens
expanded, and so had the value of their loans. But after 1840, loans of this sort grew
rarer (11 percent of borrowers were industrialists in 1865 and 1899) and dropped even
more in value (they were 5 percent of mortgage debt in 1865, and 9 percent in 1899),
even though the population and industry continued to grow.21 The decline may reflect
the migration of large firms from the local capital market to those of Lille or Paris,
and thus from notaries to banks.
Alternatively, the growth of investment banking in France after the middle of the
century may have provided an alternative source of long-term financing that would
have replaced mortgage-backed credit in Amiens. An investment bank could find
investors who could contribute new equity through a private placement, or it could
raise money to sell publicly traded shares or debt. All three funding vehicles would be
alternative sources of long-term funds that would complement the short-term loans
that banks had long made.
The story in Troyes was similar to that in Amiens, with what we shall henceforth
call industrialists (even though our use of the term would include some industrial
20. The description of the cities comes from Almanach du commerce 1842 (1829–45): 549–50, 901–22,
942–43, 1011; and Garrier 1975: 396–99. The population figures (rounded to the nearest thousand) are from
the 1841 census, as published in Lepetit 1988. They omit what were in some cases burgeoning suburbs.
21. Annuaire-Almanach du commerce 1875, 2: 3170.
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FIGURE 2. Number and value of mortgages in Amiens by borrower occupation,
1840–99.
Source: See text.
workers) taking on 17 percent of the mortgage loans and 25 percent of the mortgage
debt in 1840. Again, many of them are from the textile industry. Thereafter their
share of loans and mortgage debt declined, only to rebound in 1899 when they were
involved in 14 percent of the loans and 20 percent of the mortgage debt (figure 3).
In Lyon, the fraction of borrowers in industry was smaller—10 percent of the
borrowers in 1840, and 8 percent in 1865—but their share of the mortgage market
remained stable up to 1899, when they appeared in 11 percent of the mortgages. As
a share of the funds lent, their portion was somewhat bigger (13 percent in 1840, 17
percent in 1899), because they took out larger-than-average-sized loans, but it too
remained relatively stable (figure 4). In Lyon, some of the borrowers classified with
services may in fact have been engaged in manufacturing, particularly early in the
century, for services included silk merchants (négociants), whose activities ranged
from providing financing and wholesale trade to organizing silk manufacture. But even
if we ignore the silk merchants, there was still an appreciable fraction of mortgage
debt that was taken on by borrowers who were clearly industrialists. And that fraction
showed no signs of shrinking despite the development of investment banking—even in
Lyon, which had long had an elaborate network of financial intermediaries, including
its own securities exchange.
In all three of these markets, industrialists therefore formed a small, but signifi-
cant fraction of borrowers in the mortgage market, and they took out a considerable
portion of the mortgage debt, nearly all of which was arranged by the traditional
intermediaries, the notaries. It is true that borrowers from the services usually were
Capitalism and Financial Development 27
FIGURE 3. Number and value of mortgages in Troyes by borrower occupation,
1840–99.
Source: See text.
FIGURE 4. Number and value of mortgages in Lyon by borrower occupation,
1840–99.
Source: See text.
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FIGURE 5. Number and value of mortgages in Paris by borrower occupation,
1840–99.
Source: See text.
more numerous and took on more of the mortgage debt. So did property owners
and persons of independent means, and in Lyon there was considerable spending on
construction (figures 2 through 4). Conceivably, some of those loans could have gone
to industry (if, e.g., a contractor built a factory, or a property owner set up a textile
business), but the uncertainties of using borrowers’ occupations to deduce the purpose
of the loans could just as well weigh in the opposite direction. Still, borrowers from
industry were important in all three cities, even in 1899, and notaries were arranging
their loans.
Paris was quite different. There a smaller fraction of the mortgage loans—and a
smaller portion of mortgage debt—were funneled to industry, except in 1865 (figures 4
and 5). Without an occupational distribution of the Paris population (we are currently
gathering data to estimate occupational distributions for it and the other cities), we
cannot tell how severely underrepresented industrial borrowers were, but there should
have been more of them.22
Why was Paris unlike the three other cities? The development of investment banking
cannot be the whole story, for in that case, we would presumably have seen more
industrial borrowers in 1840, before investment banks had developed. One possibility
is that the distribution of wealth in Paris left many potential borrowers without the
22. In 1865, 9 percent of the mortgages went to industrial borrowers in Paris; in 1899, 4.3 percent. A
comparison of the 1860 industrial census and the 1866 population census suggests that 11 percent of the
population was employed in industry in Paris circa 1865, which is only a bit larger than 9 percent for the
mortgage borrowers, but the 11 percent figure is likely an underestimate, because the two censuses leave
out the industrial suburbs of Paris. A similar comparison using the 1896 census implies that 21 percent of
the Paris population worked in industry, a figure much larger than the percentage of mortgage borrowers
in industry. The suburbs around Amiens, Lyon, and Troyes pose similar problems.
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collateral needed to take out a mortgage loan. Ownership of a home or of real property
was much less common in Paris than in other parts of France, and the distribution of
wealth of all sorts was much more unequal than in other French cities. Furthermore,
the assets that Parisian entrepreneurs had were typically things that could not be used
to secure a mortgage, such as receivables or goods that were in the process of being
manufactured. Without any property that could be pledged as collateral, a would-be
industrial entrepreneur could not take out a mortgage, unless the industrial property
he planned to purchase or build could secure the loan.
In addition, industrial entrepreneurs in Paris had an easier time looking on their own
for investors who would buy equity privately or make a long-term loan. Locating such
partners was much easier in a large city like Paris. The typical partner, particularly if
the borrower had no collateral, often came from the same line of business. He might
be an older entrepreneur who had manufactured the same goods but wanted to exit
active management and live off earnings from a business he was familiar with. Or he
might be a supplier or a major customer. He would in any case know the borrower
well and be able to judge his reputation and assess the value of his human capital. He
could also intervene in the business if the borrower began to fail. The information he
had could make lending possible even if borrowers lacked collateral, but it would be
harder to find similar partners in smaller cities. There might simply not be an older
manufacturer in the same line of business, or a supplier or customer with funds to lend.
To judge from the borrowers’ occupations—despite all the uncertainties that
entails—mortgages did seem to be funding industrialization, over and above the role
they played in financing the construction and the growth of services that accompanied
the expansion of manufacturing. They may have raised more money for industry early
on, before investment banking developed, but industrial borrowers were still turning
to the mortgage market in 1899, when the financial system was highly sophisticated.
The firms that were doing so were likely smaller firms that could not afford the fixed
fees involved in turning to an investment bank. The mortgage market was particularly
important outside of Paris, because in Paris ownership of collateral was rarer and
partnerships easier to find. But even in Paris its role was not insignificant.
To get a sense of how important the mortgage debt was, consider that in our four
markets between 5 and 20 percent of the new mortgage debt in 1899 went to industrial
borrowers. If the percentage of industrial debt was similar in other French cities in
1899—between the 5 percent in Paris and the 20 percent in Troyes—then the mortgage
market would have raised between 29 and 127 million francs for industrialists in 1899.
By one standard this is a small amount, certainly when compared to 824 million
in capital raised by new multiowner firms in 1900 (table 2).23 Many of these new
multiowner firms would, of course, not have been industrial; they would have been in
23. The evidence here comes from the 1900 Archives commerciales de la France 27 (1874–1955: 1900:
104), which published descriptions of all new multiowner firms, including the capital they were authorized
to raise. The coverage included very small firms and it ranged over all forms of organization, from partner-
ships to corporations. Not all of the authorized capital mentioned in the descriptions would have been paid
immediately, but because older firms would have been calling the capital they were authorized to raise, the
824 million figure might be a reasonable rough estimate for new equity mobilized by all firms in 1899.
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TABLE 2. New capital raised by multiowner firms and new mortgage debt taken
on by industrial borrowers, 1899–1900
All French cities with population over
10,000 All such cities except Paris
Percent of debt taken on by
























mortgage debt in the
cities in 1899 (million
francs)
634 634 454 454
Mortgage debt going to
industry in the cities
(million francs)
29 127 40 91
Capital raised by new
multiowner firms in 1900
(million francs)
824 824 287 287
Mortgage debt going to
industry/capital raised by
new multiowner firms
0.04 0.15 0.14 0.32
Source: For the mortgage debt in 1899, our samples from Amiens, Lyons, Paris, and Troyes, and our panel data for
105 mortgage markets for estimates for France as a whole. For the capital raised by new multiowner firms in 1900,
our source was 1900 Archives commerciales de la France 27 (104).
Note: The multiowner firms include businesses outside of industry—in the services, e.g. Very little capital was
mobilized by multiowner firms outside cities. Our totals for the capital raised by such firms are therefore either the
total for France as a whole in 1900 (824 million francs) or the total outside of Paris (287 million francs).
The capital raised by new multiowner firms is the total authorized. One-quarter of this had to be paid immediately,
but the rest might be paid in subsequent years. We used the total authorized to account (at least approximately) for
capital calls by existing firms.
the services, for example, or construction. Yet this is the wrong standard because the
bulk (64 percent in Paris) of the equity finance went to the 5 percent of the firms that
were the largest. These big firms, one might suspect did not rely on notaries at all,
because their needs were satisfied by investment bankers. Yet even that is far from
assured because nearly a quarter of the big firms were partnerships, and many of the
others issued too few shares for a market to be made in them. Clearly then, modern
capital markets were not a panacea. Their rise did not coincide with the disappearance
of small firms.
Outside Paris, the mortgage market may have been even more important as a source
of financing. Because two-thirds of the equity raised by new firms went to ones in
Paris, much less was available in provincial cities. There, with partners harder to
find, the mortgage market would have taken on greater importance as a source of
money, particular for small businesses. Furthermore, the ownership of real assets
was more common in the provinces, making it easier for provincial entrepreneurs to
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raise money in the mortgage market. We estimate that the mortgage debt taken on
by industrial borrowers in cities outside Paris amounted to somewhere between 14
and 32 percent of the all new capital raised by multiowners firms in the provinces in
1900 (table 2). Again, because many of the multiowner firms would not have been
industrial businesses, and if so, then the mortgage debt would have been an even
larger fraction of the capital raised by new industrial firms in the provinces.
Mortgage markets are often overlooked, despite their role in the 2008 crisis. In
France, they clearly played a significant role in economic growth. How important
they turn out to be in other economies depends on the context. Where other forms of
credit (such as credit cooperatives) are highly developed, mortgages may play less of a
role than in France; where property is more widely distributed than in Paris, they may
play more of a role. Because alternative sources of credit vary both across polities and
within polities, understanding these interconnections and how they evolve over time
demands an attention to detail that privileges the craft of the historian. The details are
relevant even if one focuses on key moments in the history of financial capitalism.
The history of credit in a town with a dominant employer, for example, is likely to be
quite different from a town where many different enterprises compete. Even though
the national legislation that enables corporate banks will apply to both communities, it
will have quite different effects. In the company town, the legislation may be irrelevant
because the town’s major employer has financial links with the country’s financial
capital and therefore does little banking in the town. As a result, banks may not
find they have enough business locally to warrant opening branches. By contrast, in
towns with many businesses, network banks may be discouraged from opening up
branches because traditional intermediaries have the competitive advantage of all the
information they have gathered. One cannot tell which of these two stories applies
without knowing local histories, as we shall see by examining several case studies.
Four Case Studies
There are thus clear signs that industrial borrowers were raising money in mortgage
markets, and plausible reasons why they would do so, particularly if they were in the
provinces, or their businesses were small, or investment banking had not yet devel-
oped. That meant they were turning to notaries, the traditional financial intermediaries
in mortgage markets.
Evidence from four detailed case studies points toward the same conclusion. The
case studies, which range from one of the largest iron works in France to smaller-scale
manufacturers and a major early electrical utility, derive from information we came
across as we were constructing our sample of mortgage loans. Each one involved a
mortgage loan where there was enough detail in the records of the tax on financial
transactions (and enough information elsewhere on the borrowers) to reveal what
the loans had been used for. They are therefore unusual and certainly not a random
sample. Nonetheless, they do shed considerable light on the role mortgage lending
played in industrialization in France and on the reasons why entrepreneurs turned to
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the mortgage market to finance their projects. And they all suggest that context was
critical when entrepreneurs sought funding for their firms.
The first case study involves a major iron works, the Société des forges de Châtillon
et Commentry, which took out a large mortgage loan in 1853. Along with cotton tex-
tiles, iron making had, of course, epitomized the Industrial Revolution. Beginning in
eighteenth-century Britain, the industry was transformed by technological advances,
as coke replaced charcoal in smelting, blast furnaces grew in size and efficiency, and
large puddling furnaces and rolling mills replaced small forges. The supply of the
wrought iron that was essential for industrial machinery swelled and its price fell.24
In the nineteenth century, the new technology spread to continental Europe, forcing
the French iron industry to remake itself. As the efficient scale of manufacturing
increased, small firms merged, and new, larger iron works sprang into existence.
Capital in turn had to be raised to pay for new plants and equipment, and family firms
had to seek out external financing.25
The consolidation gave birth to the Société des forges de Châtillon et Commentry. It
was formed in 1845, when 34 iron makers in east central France joined their dispersed
operations to create the Société as a limited partnership with tradable shares (société
en commandite par actions). The partners who merged their businesses included the
third- and fourth-largest iron makers in France, and in terms of sales the new firm
was the biggest iron maker in France, with 37 blast furnaces, 60 forges (including
four using the British technology), and capital worth between 8 and 20 million francs.
To cut its costs, Châtillon et Commentry leased out inefficient iron works and plants
that were too distant from the rest of its operations. It also took on debt to finance
changes in its business and in all likelihood update its technology.26 The firm went
on to operate independently until 1979 when it merged with Usinor. At the end of
the Second Empire it was, at least by capitalization, the biggest iron maker in the
country.27
The mortgage market was a major source of funds for Châtillon et Commentry. In
1853, the partnership had the Parisian notaries Daguin and Delapalme undertake a
private placement of 6 million francs of mortgage debt that complemented the equity
raised from its partners. The notaries rounded up 18 lenders who would advance the
6 million in return for 12,000 500-franc bearer bonds issued by the firm and secured
by mortgages on assets that included its iron works and real estate in Paris and the
provinces. The bearer bonds—each numbered and easily transferred—would be re-
24. Mokyr 1990: 92–96.
25. Gille 1968: 158–71.
26. Ibid., 150–68. The act creating the partnership estimated the capital to be worth 20 million francs,
including 6 million of working capital. Initially, the capital had been evaluated at 8 million francs, but
after disagreements over the value of particular iron works, the figure was raised to 20 million, which
Gille considers exaggerated. The evidence that the firm wanted to update its technology is indirect. To
begin with, the small number of forges using British technology suggests that much of the new firm’s
technology was old fashioned. So does the fact that the partners to the merger had not appeared on the list
of the technologically advanced iron works allowed to submit bids in 1842 for the initial construction of
railroads.
27. Ibid., 189.
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deemed for 625 francs each by annual random drawings over a 25-year period and pay
4 percent interest until redeemed. If we ignore the risk of default or early repayment,
the lenders could expect a return of 8.2 percent, at a time when ordinary mortgages
paid 5 percent. The 18 lenders—only one of whom had any obvious connection to
Châtillon et Commentry—thus earned a relatively high return on bonds that were
potentially easy to sell. Although they assumed considerable risk, they gained a great
deal of protection from the loan covenants. Dividends could not be paid if the bond
interest or capital reimbursement was in arrears, and the random drawings of the
redemption plan discouraged the firm from trying to pit lenders against one another.
Furthermore, even if there was a default, there were assets to seize, including real
estate whose value was not tied to the iron industry, and thanks to the registration
of mortgages with the government’s lien registry, the lenders knew that their claims
would be senior to any subsequent debt that the firm took on.28
For firm with real assets like Châtillon et Commentry, the mortgage market made
long-term borrowing possible at a time when commercial banks offered only short-
term loans and France’s embryonic investment bankers were not yet ready to fund
huge numbers of big industrial projects. Mortgages like Châtillon et Commentry’s
gave creditors making long-term loans a variety of protections, and it should thus
come as no surprise that other iron makers besides Châtillon et Commentry also
raised money in the mortgage market at mid-century.29 At the time, iron makers
typically possessed large amounts of real property that could secure mortgage loans.
Châtillon et Commentry, for example, had not just its iron works and Paris real estate,
but woods (for fuel), farm land, water mills, and coal and iron mines. Other firms
in the iron industry were similar, apart from the Paris real estate.30 They too could
borrow on the mortgage market, and when used as collateral, their real property would
reduce the cost of their loans. They too would have an incentive to turn to notaries and
seek funding in the mortgage market, and the same would be true of other industries
where firms typically owned real estate. Although relying on the mortgage market
to issue bearer bonds may therefore seem unusual, it made eminent sense in the
mid-nineteenth-century, at least for firms with real assets.
One might think that this loan of Châtillon et Commentry’s was unprecedented in
its scale and only possible with capitalism and economic growth. But loans that were
even larger were floated under the Old Regime—for instance, the 1780 refinancing of
the bonds of the fermiers généraux, who collected France’s indirect taxes under the
Old Regime. The 40 fermiers généraux advanced a year’s revenue (60 million livres),
a total that amounted to 10 times what Châtillon et Commentry raised. Each tax farmer
28. Archives nationales, Minutier Central Etude CXVII 1228 (March 13, 1853). Although the lenders
had contracted to lend 6 million francs and thus to buy all 12,000 bonds, it is not clear that they did so,
because the contract does not cover the entire process of paying the money in. It does demonstrate that
at least 1.8 million francs was raised. In addition to the mortgage on the firm’s real property, the lenders
could also go after the firm’s current managers.
29. In 1851, the sixth biggest iron maker in the 1840s, Schneider et Compagnie, used a mortgage to
guarantee a 9 million franc loan from the Banque de France to its coal mining affiliate: Archives nationales,
Minutier Central, Etude XCIII 641 (August 18, 1851).
30. Archives nationales, Minutier Central Etude CXVII 1228 (March 13, 1853); Gille 1968.
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was responsible for 1.5 million livres and many turned to notaries to finance part of
their quota. The lenders who furnished the funds provided on average 58,000 livres,
or the equivalent of 116 of Châtillon et Commentry’s bearer bonds.31 We will leave
it up to the reader to decide which of these was more capitalistic; one thing is clear:
neither the fermiers généraux nor Châtillon et Commentry relied on modern financial
intermediaries, but they still raised substantial amounts of money.
If the contrast between Châtillon et Commentry and the fermiers généraux raises
questions for the chronology of capitalism, the firm’s decision to rely upon Parisian
notaries raises questions about the spatial dimensions of the French credit market.
Châtillon et Commentry decided to do its borrowing in Paris. It did not turn to no-
taries in Dijon, Moulins, or any other local credit markets near where its iron-making
operations were located. The same was true for Schneider Freres and the Forges
de Montbard, the other major iron makers. The French iron and steel industry was
dispersed throughout the country, but it only had one capital market: Paris.
Underdeveloped investment banking may have pushed Châtillon et Commentry to
take out a mortgage loan in 1853, but by 1899 France had all the investment banks
it needed, along with a large and active market for stocks and bonds, so that firms
seeking to fund long-term investments could presumably issue tradable equity or sell
bonds.32 The trouble, though, was that there was a fixed cost involved in hiring an
investment bank to sell the debt or equity; there was also a fixed cost involved in
listing the shares or debt on a securities exchange. Those fixed costs might well be
prohibitive for start-ups or small firms. Start-ups would face yet another obstacle:
they would have no track record to convince investors that their debt or equity was
worth buying. And they might face similar problems when they sought bank loans,
unless they paid a high interest rate or surrendered control of their young firm. Older
definitions of capitalism (in particular, identifying capitalism with large enterprises
and gigantic markets) would dismiss all this lending as irrelevant. But a new firm
that takes out a mortgage loan might become an industry leader, and the small firms
might well form the nucleus of a new and burgeoning industry that generates rapid
economic growth.
To see what the advantages of mortgage lending were for a small firm, consider the
mortgage loan taken out in 1899 by Bonnet, Spazin et Compagnie, a Lyon boilermaker
and manufacturer of industrial equipment. It turned to the mortgage market in 1899
to borrow 12,000 francs. The sum was much less than the 6 million Châtillon et
Commentry sought, but it was typical of many mortgages in Lyon, where the median
mortgage was 10,000 francs that year. And although Bonnet, Spazin et Compagnie
was small, it was not at all marginal. It was in fact a well-known supplier of boilers
31. Our 20 percent sample of for Paris in 1780 turned up 86 loans to the fermiers généraux, for a total
of 5.5 million livres. The estimated total for Paris as a whole in 1780 was therefore 27.5 million livres, or
almost half the 60 million the fermiers were expected to pony up. The estimate is actually a lower bound.
The loans made to fermiers généraux may have been less liquid than Châtillon et Commentry’s bearer
bonds.
32. Rajan and Zingales 2003: 5–50.
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and mechanical equipment for tramways, chemical factories, and power plants, and
it remained in business until the 1930s.33
To make the loan, Bonnet, Spazin et Compagnie’s notary matched the firm up with
the Baron de Jerphanion, a rentier living in Veauchette, some 70 kilometers away. The
baron earned 3.75 percent interest over the six-year course of the loan, a relatively
low interest rate in 1899, even for mortgages. Perhaps the rate was low because of
the protection that the loan covenants gave the baron. He got liens on the firm’s
workshops, equipment, and land (on which existing mortgages had been paid off);
guarantees that the workshops would be insured against fire, which was a risk in the
firm’s operations; the right to have a new administration named or to have the firm
liquidated in case there was no management; and, last but not least, a boost in the
interest rate if his revenues from loan were subject to any new tax.34
Such loans to tiny companies were not peculiar to Lyon.35 Again, the advantage
that the mortgage market offered was that the fixed cost of consulting a notary was
likely lower than that involved in hiring an investment bank and listing securities. The
higher fixed cost would then deter small firms. The cost of funds was likely lower too,
at least for firms with real assets that could be pledged as collateral for a mortgage,
for even firms that did have shares traded on local exchanges sought funds in the
mortgage market. In 1899, for example, the Compagnie Lyonnaise de construction
de voitures et jouets d’enfants, a toy and vehicle maker in Lyon, took out a 40-year
120,000 franc mortgage made by the mortgage bank, Crédit Foncier de France.36 (A
notary may therefore have played little or no role in arranging the loan.) The borrower
was certainly miniscule, and it was also young because it had only been founded in
1895. Yet despite its size and recent origin, its shares (with a nominal value of 800,000
francs) were traded on the Lyon stock exchange and its earnings were reported in the
financial press. The market for the shares was undoubtedly thin—it was described as
a local company, with no investors from outside the area—but it had at least managed
to get its shares listed. And doing so must not have been impossible for other small
or new firms, for Lyon exchange had added listings for 308 securities between 1889
33. Archives départementales du Rhône, 49 Q 304bis (February 22, 1899), and 3E notary Berloty (February
21, 1899); The Electrical World 32 (27) (December 31, 1898): 722–23; The Electrical Review 35 (868) (July
13, 1894): 28; The Electrical Review 35 (869) (July 20, 1894): 60; and the entry for Bonnet-Spazin at Région
Rhône-Alpes Service régional de l’Inventaire du Patrimoine Culturel’s web site for Patrimoine architectural
et mobilier en Rhône-Alpes, at http://sdx.rhonealpes.fr/sdx/sribzh/main.xsp (accessed September 22, 2010).
The data on median and average loan size in Lyon in 1899 come from our sample.
34. Archives départementales du Rhône, 49 Q 304bis (February 22, 1899), and 3E notary Berloty (February
21, 1899).
35. For another example, in 1899, a small, year-old Swiss baking company from Vevey (a town already
known for chocolate making and as the headquarters of Nestlé) borrowed 12,000 francs to buy land and
build a factory in Pontarlier, a French market some 86 kilometers away. The baking company, the Société
Anonyme de Biscuits Lactés Bussy, had a French notary arrange the loan with a property owner and
industrialist from Pontarlier, Felix Junod. The loan had been authorized by the company’s shareholders,
and in return the lender received a lien on the firm’s land and factory, plus 4 percent interest over the
nine-year term of the loan. Archives départementales du Doubs, 70 Q 398 (February 3, 1899); Albert
Pfiffner, archivist of Nestlé (pers. comm., July 21, 2010).
36. Archives départementales du Rhône, 49 Q 304 (April 24, 1899), 49 Q 305 (May 12, 1899).
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and 1900, including companies whose shares were worth as little as 150,000 francs.37
But even though it had access to a local securities market, the toy maker nonetheless
chose to raise money using a mortgage loan. The mortgage market must have had an
appeal for small or new companies, even when they could sell stock, and the likely
reason is that the cost of raising money was lower.
This and the other examples in fact suggest that the mortgage market and notaries
possessed several enduring advantages for industrial firms, so long as they had real
assets that could secure their loan. First of all, by giving lenders real collateral, the
firms could borrow at lower interest rates and for terms long enough to undertake
major investments. Second, even after investment banking was able to provide long-
term funding, small firms or start-ups might still find the mortgage market appealing,
because of their size or because they had yet to build up a reputation for creditworthi-
ness or profitability. And mortgages could remain attractive even after firms got their
shares or debt listed on local markets. In a sense then, the mortgage market might
have functioned as a source of venture capital, but without surrendering the owner’s
control. The liens would protect lenders and substitute for the lack of control. And if
the mortgage debt was not traded on an exchange, then it might even be possible to
borrow without getting the shareholders’ approval.38
One final example illustrates how the mortgage market could feed venture capital
to small start-up firms. In 1899, the industrialist and property owner Pierre Marie
Durand borrowed 200,000 francs from 14 lenders in Lyon. He paid 4 percent for the
10-year loan, which had been arranged by his notary, Lavirotte.39 Although Durand
had begun his career as a lawyer (or more precisely, an avoué), he was on his way
to building the second-largest electrical utility in France. He and family members
assembled the utility by buying up regional producers and then cutting their costs by
taking advantage of economies of scale in administration and in the reserve capacity
needed for production. They retained a tight administrative hold over the utility as it
was growing, and to maintain control, they refrained from issuing stock outside the
family and they also avoided borrowing from banks that would want an inside role.
Ultimately, they did manage to raise funds from other banks and from private
placements, but the notarial loan in 1899 seems to have been one of the first steps on
the way to creating the utility. That same year Durand and his brother Barthélemy got
the concession to generate and distribute electricity in Saint Symphorien sur Coise,
37. Comité départemental du Rhône 1900: 643–50; Journal financier, politique et agricole, 42 (2103)
(February 9, 1908): 125. On average, the recently listed local firms on the Lyon stock exchange had shares
worth 2.1 million francs, making our toy maker smaller than the mean.
38. A law of 1867 required shareholder approval for tradable debt. If the firm’s own by-laws did not
require shareholder approval of mortgage debt, it would be possible to borrow on the mortgage market
without getting the owners’ okay. If the mortgage market did provide capital to small firms in 1899, then
the industrial borrowers we find in Lyon and other cities should be smaller than the average firm. We may
be able to test that hypothesis, and the process of identifying borrowers as industrial will only bias the
results against finding that it is true, because the borrowers we identify are likely bigger than normal.
39. Unfortunately, the loan contract was unavailable, because the successors to the notary Lavirotte have
not yet turned their archives over to the departmental archives in Lyon. Our sole source of information
about the loan was the records of the tax on financial transactions, AD Rhône 46 Q 334 (November 25,
1899).
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a small town 50 kilometers from Lyon, where they financed the necessary capital
expenses. We cannot be certain that the 200,000 franc loan was used to begin their
operation in Saint Symphorien sur Coise, but it was the earliest part of the Durand
utility empire, and the 200,000 francs was on the same scale as the Saint Symphorien
Company’s ownership equity of 150,000 francs.40 The mortgage loan may well have
been critical for creating a future industrial behemoth.
Our research design did not aim to recover information about how notarial markets
might have helped small- and medium-size enterprises. We wanted to quantify the
scale of these markets and understand the evolution of the institutions that enabled
lenders and borrowers to match and how these evolved with the arrival of banks.
Along the way we discovered a world of credit that was more complicated than we
had anticipated—one where the boundaries between modern and capitalistic, on the
one hand, and traditional, on the other, were at best blurred. Yet much of the work
that allows us to understand how the plethora of small firms financed themselves
remains to be done. Unlike the large firms that have often left archives, or whose
large financial issues can be tracked on secondary markets, the reconstruction of the
credit dealings of smaller entities requires more patience. The value of such work
goes far beyond capitalism. To be sure, it would enhance our understanding of the
process of economic development, but it would also bring about a reconsideration of
the interconnections between society and economy. The credit and financial relations
of a locality are likely to be reflected in and to further its social structures. Moreover,
there are important connections with culture, for successful entrepreneurs are likely
to establish their social position with a variety of cultural expenses that can either
conform or challenge established practices. Similarly, failure, decline, or bankruptcy
has important cultural implications, which a simple focus on capitalism will miss.
Conclusion
The data from our sample yield the first estimates of how much business traditional
financial intermediaries in any economy were doing. It turns out to have been an
enormous amount. The traditional intermediaries in our example—French notaries—
were raising as much money (relative to the size of the economy) as banks and
savings and loans did in the United States in the 1950s. That so much borrowing went
on outside modern financial institutions raises serious doubts about the argument that
connects financial development and economic growth. At the very least, the causal
links from financial development to economic growth could well have been weaker
than is usually supposed.
40. Vuillermot 2001. For the Saint Symphorien sur Coise and the origins of the company, see pp. 39–40.
The lack of the notarial documents is not the only reason it is difficult to tell precisely what the 1899 loan
was used for. The origins of Durand’s company are also murky: Vuillermot, who wrote a detailed company
history, was unable to get access to Durand’s family archives, and the company records, which found their
way into EDF’s records when Durand’s firm was nationalized in 1945, have little on Durand’s early days.
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More important, the notaries’ financial dealings make it clear that context was
critical when entrepreneurs raised money in the early stages of economic growth or
when young businesses or firms in new industries sought funds. Investment bankers
were not yet on scene, and even after they appeared, the young businesses and new
industries may have had trouble finding long-term funding because they had yet to
establish a reputation and there was little information about their creditworthiness or
profitability. That left an opening for loans secured by mortgages, which the notaries
could arrange. If they had real assets to secure a loan, entrepreneurs could borrow
at low cost and benefit from the information that notaries had built up about cred-
itworthiness, the value of collateral, and who had money to lend. But they did not
necessarily do this everywhere: they did in Lyon, but not in Dijon or Moulins, at least
for nearby iron makers, who instead sought out notaries in Paris.
Would the same be true in other economies as they experienced economic growth?
No one knows, and only historians can tell us. In another economy, the sort of in-
dividuals who possessed the information French notaries had could turn out to be
quite different. During the “Second Industrial Revolution” at the turn of the twentieth
century, for example, manufacturers in Cleveland got start-up money from informal
networks of financiers.41 In general, the answer would depend on the context, and
historians are the ones who can find out. They could take a particular place or industry
and investigate who funded young firms or new industries. They could also try to de-
termine, for another economy, how much financing went on before modern financial
intermediaries appeared. Both types of research would reveal much that is new about
capitalism and economic growth.
They could also explore the spatial arrangement of financial markets. Our discus-
sion of Châtillon et Commentry might suggest that a national capital market was in
place in France by the 1850s, because large firms everywhere could solicit funding in
Paris. But smaller firms (the vast majority of business enterprises) and individuals did
business in much narrower financial confines. For some, therefore, financial integra-
tion had occurred early on; for others it would come much later. At any time, many
credit markets coexisted. Sticking to older definitions of financial capitalism would
risk privileging the large modern one at the expense of the others, even though they
were sizeable and important.
When one rethinks financial capitalism beyond the confines of “modern” interme-
diaries like banks and stock markets, a different, and likely more important, history
emerges. It is not a history that selects winners and losers simply because they do or do
not conform to type, but a history that places change in its proper context. For financial
development that means starting long before the arrival of universal banks and contin-
uing on past their rise. And it means looking at more than a handful of major financial
centers.
41. Lamoreaux et al. 2006, 2007.
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